Abstract This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to theoretical predictions, incurring substantial losses. There is high variance in individual bids and strong heterogeneity across individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, their bids have lower variance, and group bids are less heterogeneous than individual bids. Therefore, groups receive significantly higher and more homogeneous payoffs than individuals. We elicit individual and group preferences toward risk using simple lotteries. The results indicate that groups make less risky decisions, which are possible explanations for lower bids in contests. Most importantly, we find that groups learn to make lower bids from communication and negotiation between group members.
Introduction
Contests are competitive games in which players make bids to win a prize. Examples include rent-seeking contests, R&D competitions between firms, and patent races. It is well documented that in most contest experiments subjects overbid relative to theoretical predictions, which is inconsistent with empirical evidence from the field. This inconsistency may be explained by the fact that firms use groups, instead of individuals, to determine their bidding strategies. While previous experimental studies employ only individuals, we examine whether groups can make "more rational" decisions than individuals in a contest experiment. We refer to a more rational decision as a decision that is closer to theoretical predictions. 1 The phenomenon of over-bidding was first discovered in an experimental contest study by Millner and Pratt (1989, 1991) and it has been further replicated by many other experiments. As a result of over-bidding, most subjects, on average, receive negative payoffs (Davis and Reilly 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky 2006; Sheremeta 2009b) . Moreover, contrary to the theoretical prediction of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, experimental studies document that individual bids are distributed on the entire strategy space, and even aggregate individual behavior is heterogeneous (Millner and Pratt 1989, 1991; Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters et al. 1998; Parco et al. 2005) .
The findings of experimental studies are hard to reconcile with some of the empirical evidence from the field. In particular, Hazlett and Michaels (1993) estimate that, in FCC lotteries, total firm expenditures account for only 38% of the final prize value, suggesting that firms do not over-bid in lottery contests. The crucial difference between lab experiments and lottery contests in the field is that lab experiments use individual bidders while many firms assemble groups such as teams of experts and committees to determine the bidding strategies (Hoffman et al. 1991; Borgers and Dustmann 2005) . 2 This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can make more rational decisions than individuals in lottery contests. We study a simple lottery contest as in Tullock (1980) . In the first treatment, individuals, while in the second treatment groups, are competing for a prize in a lottery contest. More specifically, a single bid is submitted by a group of two subjects after they exchange free-form text messages in a chat window for 1 min. This distinguishes our study from other studies with exogenous group decision rules, i.e., the average of the group members' bids in Cox and Hayne (2005) , the sum of the group members' bids in Ahn et al. (2009) , and the bestshot or weakest-link in Sheremeta (2009c) . The results of the experiment indicate that although groups still overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium, groups indeed make more rational decisions than individuals: groups make 25% lower bids, bids have less variance, and groups are less heterogeneous. As a result, groups receive significantly higher and more homogeneous payoffs than individuals. A possible explanation for these findings is that groups make less risky decisions than individuals. Most importantly, we find that groups learn to make lower bids from communication and negotiation between group members.
Our results contribute to at least three research areas. First, our study contributes to the discussion on why there is over-bidding in contests. Over the last decade, a number of studies have offered different explanations. The first common explanation is that
